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Abstract: Starting from an econometric model successfully used to explain and 
then predict the distribution of medal wins across nations at the Beijing 
Summer Olympics, a similar model is elaborated on with some different 
explanatory variables for estimating the determinants of medals won per nation 
at Winter Games. A Tobit estimation of the model based on data from 1964 to 
2010 shows that GDP per capita, population, the endowment in ski and winter 
sports resorts, and a host country dummy are significant determinants of medal 
wins at Winter Olympics. Then the estimated model is used for predicting the 
sporting outcomes at the 2014 Sochi Games with a focus on Russia and China. 
The Russian team is expected to perform better than in Vancouver 2010 and to 
be ranked fourth behind the USA, Germany and Canada while the Chinese 
team would be ranked ninth, a performance doomed to improve in the future 
given China’s swift economic development. 
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1 Introduction 
Soon after Russia had obtained the organisation of Winter Olympics in Sochi 2014, the 
official expectation of Russian government became that the Russian Federation will win 
the Games she is going to host. Such expectation may have been strengthened by the 
outstanding Olympic performance of China at 2008 Beijing Summer Games since the 
host country has won the greatest number of gold medals and the second overall number 
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of medals. However, is hosting the Games enough to win? Sports economists are used to 
explain a nation’s performance at mega-sporting events by more variables than a single 
host country effect. Their explanatory variables usually encompass at least economic 
development, GDP size or growth, and often the magnitude of a nation’s population. 
Thus, a next question is to check whether economic development is a significant and 
possibly major determinant of Olympic medal wins. 
This paper attempts to respond the above question with a focus on Russia and China. 
These two countries are of particular interest. China is now ranked the second country in 
the world as regard its GDP and has the biggest population compared to any other 
country. Moreover, its rate of economic growth has been one of the fastest in the world 
over the past two decades. Economists are not surprised that Olympic performances of 
the Chinese team have improved with such fast economic development, and the 2008 
Games confirmed it. 
The former USSR has been for decades one of the best two Olympic performers in 
the world, at both Summer and Winter Games, ahead of or right behind the USA 
depending on the year. Economic and political transition and the break-up of the former 
Soviet Union have interrupted the series of high Olympic achievements by the Russian 
team (Poupaux and Andreff, 2007). With the transformational economic recession 
(Kornaï, 1994) the former Soviet sport system fell apiece (Andreff et al., 2012). Although 
Russia has recovered from recession after 1998, she did not get back to a number of 
Olympic medals comparable to the former times even when adding all other CIS 
countries to her medal count. Winning 72 medals at the 2008 Beijing Summer Games 
was considered as bad performance by Russian political and sporting authorities. With  
15 medals won at the 2010 Vancouver Games, Russia ranked the sixth Winter Olympic 
country behind the USA, Germany, Canada, Norway and Austria; Russian authorities 
were disappointed again. The Russian performance at the 2012 London Games has 
improved up to 82 medals and new hope is that the Russian team would win the greatest 
number of medals at Sochi Olympics. 
Consequently another question is to see whether Russia will be able to recover its 
former (Soviet) level of Olympic performance after nearly one decade of fast economic 
growth (1999–2007) and despite her muddling through the current global financial crisis 
since 2008. After a drop in her economic growth in 2008–2009, the Russian Federation 
returned to moderate growth in 2010 and recovered its pre-crisis output level in 2011. 
With a 142 million population and a $10,400 gross national income (GNI) per capita on 
average in 2007–2011 – according to World Bank data, Russia is still a big and rather 
developed country which should eventually come back again to better Olympic 
performance. In particular, if she is compared to China with a $4,930 GNI per capita and 
a 1,340 million population. 
Facing a lack of economic studies devoted to Winter Games in the sports economics 
literature so far, this paper attempts a breakthrough in this area. To the best of our 
knowledge nobody has elaborated on an economic model for predicting medal wins at 
Winter Olympics and this is Forrest et al. (2012) contention as well. This contrasts with 
Summer Olympics for which about thirty studies have estimated the economic 
determinants of medal wins. It has been empirically verified that the number of medals a 
nation can make at Summer Games significantly depends on its population and GDP per 
inhabitant (Andreff, 2001). In the past decade, various papers started providing economic 
predictions of medal distribution per nation at the next Olympic Games (Bernard, 2008; 
Bernard and Busse, 2004; Johnson and Ali, 2004, 2008; Maennig and Wellebrock, 2008; 
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Wang and Jiang, 2008). Our own model has exactly predicted 70%, and correctly (with a 
small error margin) 88% of medal win totals per nation at the 2008 Beijing Olympics 
(Andreff et al., 2008; Andreff, 2010). The dependent variable is the same for Winter and 
Summer Games – the number of medals won by each participating nation. Though some 
independent variables of the Summer Games model have to be kept for Winter Games, 
some new variables must be introduced to capture the specificity of Winter Olympic 
sports. Thus, we will take stake of good predictions achieved with our Summer Olympics 
model to adapt it in view of forecasting the distribution of medal wins per nation at the 
2014 Sochi Winter Games. 
The paper reads as follows. 
1 It starts with briefly reminding the most interesting methodologies at work in 
estimating Summer Olympics medal win distribution. 
2 Then it shows how our own model has resolved this issue. 
3 The model was used to predict medal totals per nation at the 2008 Olympics and the 
prediction was compared to actual outcomes reached by different nations in Beijing, 
a comparison which is absolutely rare in the literature so far. 
4 A brief discussion provides justifications for keeping some similar variables in a 
model attempting to estimate the determinants of medal win distribution at Winter 
Olympics and for introducing some new variables that fit better with explaining 
winter sports performance; the discussion comes out with a somewhat different 
model. 
5 The latter is estimated with data gathered for Winter Games from 1964 to 2010. 
6 The estimated model is then used to predict the medal win distribution across nations 
at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics with a focus on the performance of Russia and 
China. 
7 A conclusion makes the reader aware that such predictions are to be taken with a 
pinch of salt. 
2 Economic determinants of Olympic medals 
An assumption is widespread among sports economists: a nation’s Olympic performance 
must be determined by her endowment in economic and human resources and the 
development of these resources. Thus, the starting point of most studies about the 
economic determinants of Olympic medal wins consists in regressing medal win totals on 
the nations’ level of GDP per capita and population. Note that the growth in the number 
of medals won by one nation logically is an equivalent decrease in medal wins for all 
other nations participating to the Olympics. Therefore, if one wants to understand the 
Olympic performance of one specific nation, account must be taken of all other 
participating nations within the overall constraint of the allocated medals total during one 
Olympics contest. 
In the first papers about the economic determinants of Olympic performance, GDP 
per capita and population were combined as explanatory variables with weather, 
nutrition, and mortality in the athletes’ home country. Later on, in various studies up to 
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the 1970s, other variables were considered as possible determinants of Olympic medal 
wins: protein consumption, religion, colonial past, newspapers supply, urban population, 
life expectancy, geographical surface area, military expenditures, judicial system and 
those sport disciplines taught at school in a nation. However, with the cold war period 
another significant variable emerged: the nation’s political regime. The first Western 
work attempting to explain medal wins by the political regime of nations (Ball, 1972) 
immediately triggered a Soviet rejoinder (Novikov and Maximenko, 1972), both 
differentiating capitalist and communist regimes. The first two econometric analyses of 
Olympic Games (Grimes et al., 1974; Levine, 1974) exhibited that communist countries 
were outliers in regressing medal wins on GDP per capita and population: they were 
winning more medals than their level of economic development and population were 
likely to predict. A last variable has been introduced, namely since Clarke (2000), which 
is the influence on medal wins of being the Olympics host country. The latter gains more 
medals than otherwise due to big crowds of national fans, a stronger motivation of 
national athletes competing on their home ground and being adapted to local weather, and 
not tired by a long pre-Games travel. 
More sophisticated econometric methodology was used in recent articles predicting 
Olympic medal wins, such as an ordered Logit model (Andreff, 2001), a Probit model 
(Nevill et al., 2002) and an ordered Probit model (Johnson and Ali, 2004). The most often 
quoted reference is Bernard and Busse (2004) whose Tobit model has been assessed as 
the most performing one and then used by Jiang and Xu (2005), Pfau (2006) and others. 
Bernard and Busse model is considered as the best one for estimating and predicting 
Olympic performance2; its two major independent variables – GDP per capita and 
population – explain the great bulk of medal distribution across participating nations. 
Three dummy variables capture a host country effect, the influence of belonging to 
Soviet-type and other communist (and post-Soviet and post-communist after 1990) 
economies as against being a non-communist market economy. These dummies are 
supposed to capture the impact of political regime on medal wins. 
3 Estimating the determinants of a nation sport performance at Summer 
Olympics 
Starting from Bernard and Busse, we have elaborated on a more specified model (Andreff 
et al., 2008) with a few improving emendations. The dependent variable is the number of 
medal wins3 per nation: Mi,t. Two primary explanatory variables are GDP per inhabitant 
in purchasing power parity dollars (PPP $) and population. Both variables are four-year 
lagged (t – 4) under the assumption that four years are required to build up, train, prepare 
and make an Olympic team the most competitive in due time, four years later. That is, for 
explaining medal wins in 2008, 2004 GDP per capita and population were taken as 
estimators. A host dummy variable is used to capture a host country effect, i.e., the 
observed surplus of medals usually won by the national team of the host country. The 
first emendation to Bernard and Busse model regards the political regime variable: 
Bernard and Busse rather crudely divided the world into communist regimes and 
capitalist market economies which obviously fits with the cold war period. Since then, 
this is too crude when it comes to so-called post-communist transition economies 
(Andreff, 2004, 2007) in particular as regard the sports economy sector which has 
differentiated a lot across former socialist countries during their institutional 
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transformation (Poupaux and Andreff, 2007). Such differentiation has translated into a 
scattered efficiency in winning Olympic medals after 1991 (Rathke and Woitek, 2008). 
The country classification which is retained here distinguishes first Central Eastern 
European countries (CEEC) which gave up a Soviet-type centrally planned economy in 
1989 or 1990, and transformed into a democratic political regime running a market 
economy: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia (and Czechoslovakia until its 1993 split), Slovenia, and the GDR 
(until German reunification in 1990). Another commonality to this group is that these 
countries have all joined the European Union in 2004 or 2007. A second country group 
(TRANS) gathers new independent states (former Soviet republics) and some former 
CMEA member states which have started up a transition similar to the one in CEECs but 
are lagging behind in terms of transformation into a democratic regime and some are 
stalling on the path toward a market economy: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan and Vietnam. None of them has joined the EU so far or has really an option to 
do so. The next two groups have not been Soviet regimes properly speaking in the past, 
although they were both communist regimes and planned economies. In the first one 
(NSCOM), we sample those countries which have started up a transition process in the 
1990s: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, China, Croatia, Laos, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia (and the former FSR Yugoslavia before the 1991 break-up). Two countries have 
not yet engaged into a democratic transformation and a market economy: Cuba and North 
Korea, and must be considered as still communist regimes (COM). All other countries are 
considered as capitalist market economies (CAPME), the reference group in our 
econometric estimations. 
Then a last variable is introduced that captures the influence on Olympic performance 
of a specific sporting culture in a region. For example, Afghan ladies are not used to have 
much sport participation or to attend sport shows, even less to be enrolled in the Olympic 
team. As a result of these cultural (sometimes institutional) disparities, some nations are 
more specialised in one specific sport discipline such as weight-lifting in Bulgaria, 
Turkey and Armenia, marathon and long distance runs in Ethiopia and Kenya, cycling in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, table tennis, judo and martial arts in Asia, sprint in 
Caribbean islands and the USA, etc. It is not easy to design a variable that would exactly 
capture such regional sporting culture differences1, but it is assumed here that regional 
dummies may reflect them. For model estimation, the world is divided into nine ‘sporting 
culture’ regions: AFS, sub-Sahara African countries; AFN: North African countries; 
NAM, North American countries; LSA, Latin and South American countries; EAST, 
Eastern European countries; WEU, Western European countries (taken as the reference 
region in our estimations); OCE, Oceania countries; MNE, Middle East countries; and 
ASI, (other) Asian countries. 
A first model tested here is simply a specification à la Bernard and Busse, but with a 
differently defined political regime variable. Estimation is based on a censored  
Tobit model since a non-negligible number of countries that participate to the Olympics 
do not win any medal. Therefore, a zero value of the Mi,t dependent variable does  
not mean that a country has not participated and we work out a simple Tobit, not a  
Tobit 2 (with a two stage Heckman procedure). Contrary to Bernard and Busse, it is not 
assumed that preparing an Olympic team is timeless and, then, independent variables are 
four-year lagged behind the dependent variable. Thus, GDP per inhabitant is noted 
(Y/N)i,t–4, measured in 1995 PPP dollars, and Ni,t–4 stands for population. Dummies are 
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introduced to test whether the Olympics year is significant, taking 2004 as reference. 
These year dummies come out to be non-significant. In a second model, a data panel 
Tobit is adopted to take into account unobserved heterogeneity, whose test is significant4, 
and then estimation is with random effects. Sampled data5 encompass all Summer 
Olympics from 1976 to 2004, except 1980 and 1984 which are skipped out due to 
boycotts which have strongly distorted the medal distribution per country. The first 
specification (1) is: 
*
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A second specification (2) is an emended variant of Bernard and Busse model including 
our more specific political regime variable, but also above-described dummies standing 
for regions of sporting culture (Regionsr,i): 
*
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In a third specification (3), an additional variable Mi,t–4 is introduced on the right-hand 
side of model (2), just like Bernard and Busse did, though they did not comment why 
they proceeded in such a way. The justification here is that winning medals at the 
previous Olympics matters for an Olympic national team which usually expects and 
attempts to achieve at least as well as four years ago. Such inertial effect is all the more 
relevant that a nation is eager to win as many medals as possible from one Olympiad to 
the other (a sort of national ‘Olympics cult’6) and mobilise a lot of resources to succeed 
in. The resulting inertia differentiates those nations pulled by Olympics cult from those 
nations which are used to win zero or few medals. These two groups must be 
distinguished with using Mi,t–4, otherwise the prediction will be distorted. 
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Table 1 Tobit estimation of medal wins at Summer Olympics 
Independent variables 
Tobit  
model (1) 
Tobit (panel) 
model (2) 
Tobit model (3) 
with lagged M 
Log population (t – 4) 9.14*** 4.15*** 2.15*** 
Log GDP per capita (t – 4) 12.42*** 5.44*** 2.73*** 
Host 24.37*** 10.40*** 10.04*** 
Political regime (ref. CAPME)    
 COM 24.34*** 11.18*** 5.76** 
 TRANS 23.24*** 20.97*** 8.15*** 
 CEEC 21.43*** 17.94*** 6.71** 
 NSCOM 11.98*** 8.06*** 5.22* 
Region (ref. WEU)    
 AFN  –4.45* –1.81 
 AFS  3.67* 0.75 
 NAM  7.93*** 0.076 
 LSA  0.57 –1.08 
 ASI  –4.34*** –2.58* 
 EAST  –5.53* –3.5 
 MNE  –5.00*** –2.47* 
 OCE  6.277** 1.3 
Year dummy (ref. 2004)    
 1976 4.63   
 1988 –0.2   
 1992 3.33   
 1996 3.35   
 2000 0.31   
Medals (t – 4)   0.95*** 
Constant –138*** –51.30*** –31.57*** 
Number of observations 941 941 831 
Log-likelihood value –1,646.1 –1,551.5 –1,224.2 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.19 0.34 
All econometric estimations deliver significant results (Table 1). In the first estimation, 
all coefficients are positive and significant at a 1% threshold, except for year dummies. 
Thus, it is once again confirmed that medal wins are determined by GDP per capita, 
population and a host country effect. Political regime is also an explanatory variable, in 
particular in the case of communist and post-communist transition countries. The second 
estimation (Tobit/panel) all in all exhibits the same results. The coefficients of regional 
sporting culture are significant except for Latin America, an area in which the North 
American sporting culture may have permeated namely through Caribbean countries and 
Mexico (classified in NAM). 
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Since Western Europe is the reference a significant coefficient with a positive sign 
means that a region performs relatively better than Western Europe in terms of winning 
Olympic medals (a negative sign means a lower relative performance than Western 
Europe). Sub-Sahara Africa, North America and Oceania perform better. It is a little bit 
surprising for Sub-Sahara African countries since they are among the least developed 
countries in the world (except South Africa), but such effect is due to a few African 
countries which are extremely specialised in one sport discipline where they are capable 
to win a non-negligible number of medals, such as Ethiopia and Kenya in long distance 
runs. With negative coefficients, North Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Middle East 
show a lower relative performance than Western Europe. It is not surprising for North 
Africa and the Middle East due to some restrictions to sporting culture in various 
countries. In the case of Asia, only few countries are really capable to win a significant 
number of medals (China, both Koreas, Mongolia). A surprise is the negative coefficient 
for Eastern European countries which are known as outliers or over-performers (given 
their GDP per capita and population). In fact, the negative coefficient results from the 
Political Regime variable which already captures their over-performance. 
4 Predicting medal wins at Beijing Olympics: comparison with observed 
outcomes 
Then model (3) was used to predict medal distribution at the 2008 Beijing Olympics: 
*
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Since a pooling estimation7 of model (3) is implemented, it may suffer from an 
endogeneity bias; the results may be biased by a correlation between the lagged 
endogenous variable and the error term. This issue is treated with a GMM dynamic panel 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991), a technique which provides estimated coefficients and 
predictions that are robust and close to those estimated with a Tobit model. Predictions 
have been first published (Andreff et al., 2008) only for a sub-sample of countries 
gathered in Table 2. 
The predicted first-rank winner was, as usual, the USA, followed by Russia and 
China, the latter benefitting from a host country effect at Beijing Games. Most developed 
and democratic market economies (CAPME) were forecast to be among the major medal 
winners together with some post-communist transition countries. The prediction for 
France was between 35 and 38 medals while the State Secretary for Sports was hoping 
that the French team would reach 40 medals (actually the achieved number was  
41 medals). 
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Table 2 Prediction of medal wins at Beijing Olympics 
 
Medals won 
in 2004 
Médial wins 
predicted  
in 2008 
Lower bound Upper bound 
CEEC     
 Bulgaria 12 12 10 13 
 Hungary 17 19 17 21 
 Poland 10 14 12 16 
 Czech Republic 8 10 8 12 
 Romania 19 21 19 23 
TRANS     
 Belarus 15 17 14 20 
 Kazakhstan 8 11 8 14 
 Russia 92 96 93 100 
 Ukraine 23 27 24 29 
NSCOM     
 China 63 80 73 86 
 Cuba 27 29 25 33 
CAPME     
 Germany 49 52 50 54 
 Australia 49 51 47 54 
 Canada 12 15 13 18 
 USA 102 106 103 110 
 France 33 36 35 38 
 Great Britain 30 47 32 35 
 Italy 32 35 34 36 
Less developed countries     
 Brazil 10 12 10 14 
 South Korea 30 30 27 32 
 Kenya 7 2 1 4 
 Jamaica 5 3 0 4 
 Turkey 10 9 7 11 
Source: Andreff et al. (2008) 
The publication of this article in France one month before the opening of Beijing 
Olympics rapidly became a hit in different French and European media and TV channels. 
First interviews focused on the predicted medal wins. In a second wave, after the Games 
end, interviewers became eager to know for which countries the model had provided 
correct or wrong prediction and, in the latter case, why were it so. This triggered the 
writing of a follow-up companion paper requested by the French National Institute for 
Sport and Physical Education (INSEP) to be included in its volume devoted to overall 
outcome for France at Beijing Olympics (Andreff, 2009). This paper systematically 
compared predictions and actual outcomes. 
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The above model (3) provided good predictions regarding those 189 countries for 
which data were available and computable: 70% of observed results belong to the 
predicted confidence interval. If one assesses a model prediction as acceptable when its 
error margin is not bigger than a two-medal difference between ex ante prevision and ex 
post reality, then model (3) correctly predicted 88% of all Beijing Olympics results. The 
remaining unexplained 12% (23 nations) account for sporting ‘surprises’ – unexpected 
results. Model (3) correctly predicted the first ten medal winners, except Japan (instead of 
Ukraine), missed only four out of the first twenty winners, although with a slightly 
different ranking. However, the most interesting results are witnessed when the model 
was clearly wrong in its prediction that basically happened for 23 countries, because this 
means that our five variables (plus the inertial variable) have not captured some core 
explanation of Olympics outcomes. Fortunately, economists are not capable to predict all 
the detailed Olympics results, otherwise why still convene the Games? 
Which are the major ‘surprises’ delivered by ex post actual sporting results when 
compared with predictions? The first one is a quite bigger than expected number of medal 
wins by the Chinese team – all published predictions have been wrong in this respect. 
Model (3) has clearly underestimated the host country effect in China. Possibly, Chinese 
performance has also been boosted by some undetected doping8. A second surprise is the 
underperformance of the Russian Olympic team, the worst since the cold war. It was 
regarded so much ‘catastrophic’ that Vladimir Putin convened the highest decision 
makers of Russian sport to command a new Olympic policy likely to avoid a repeated 
disaster at the 2012 London Olympics. A policy which partly succeeded with 82 medals 
won in London. In the same vein, some other transition countries, namely Romania, have 
won fewer medals than expected in Beijing. The current state of reforming institutions 
and restructuring the whole sports sector in these countries has not been sufficiently 
captured in our model, despite our more refined political regime variable. 
The last three significant surprises were Great Britain, Jamaica and Kenya, the latter 
being the only two developing countries ranked among the first twenty medal winners. 
Early preparation of a super-competitive team for the 2012 London Olympics may have 
been the cause for higher than expected outcomes of the British team, as it is suggested 
by Maennig and Wellebrock (2008) who have introduced a ‘next Olympics host country’ 
variable in their prediction. However, such future host country effect slightly improves 
the authors’ forecast: 38 predicted medals as against 47 won by Great Britain. Without 
such effect model (3) predicted between 32 and 35 medals for Great Britain. British 
medals concentration in cycling (12 medals) may trace back again to undetected doping 
and/or deep specialisation of a nation in one sport discipline. The latter is the most likely 
explanation for Jamaican medals9 concentrated in sprint and Kenyan medals in long 
distance runs. Though such specialisation has been taken into account with the lagged 
Mi,t–4 variable – Kenya had won seven medals and Jamaica five in the same disciplines at 
Athens Olympics –, the inertia captured by this variable reveals to be insufficient. 
5 A model adapted to estimating the determinants of medal wins at Winter 
Olympics 
The sporting context of Winter Olympics is rather different compared with the one of 
Summer Olympics. In 1976, 92 countries had participated to Summer Olympics with 
6,084 athletes while they were only 37 countries participating to Winter Olympics the 
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same year, with 1,123 athletes (Table 3). In 2004, 201 countries were participating to 
Athens Olympics with 10,658 athletes whereas 80 countries had participated to the 2006 
Winter Games in Turin with 2,651 athletes. Winter Olympics is a quite smaller  
mega-sporting event compared to Summer Games. However, the former has grown a lot 
during the lapse of time covered in this paper. The number of participating countries has 
increased from 36 in 1964 up to 82 in 2010 while the number of participating athletes has 
augmented from 1,091 to 2,629. The number of medals to be won at Winter Olympics is 
smaller than the one observed at Summer Olympics (over 900 overall since 2000), but it 
has grown from 103 in 1964 up to 258 in 2010. The number of nations having won at 
least one Winter Olympic medal has increased from 14 in 1964 to 26 in 2010 (as against 
a maximum of 80 countries at the 2000 Summer Games). 
Table 3 Winter Olympic performances, 1964–2010 
City Year 
Participating 
countries 
Countries 
with M > 0 
Overall number 
of medals 
Participating 
athletes 
Innsbruck 1964 36 14 103 1091 
Grenoble 1968 37 15 106 1171 
Sapporo 1972 35 17 105 1008 
Innsbruck 1976 37 16 111 1123 
Lake Placid 1980 37 19 115 1072 
Sarajevo 1984 48 17 117 1279 
Calgary 1988 57 17 138 1424 
Albertville 1992 63 20 171 1772 
Lillehammer 1994 67 22 183 1747 
Nagano 1998 72 24 205 2176 
Salt Lake City 2002 77 24 234 2386 
Turin 2006 80 26 252 2651 
Vancouver 2010 82 26 258 2629 
Since population, GDP per inhabitant and the host country dummy variable have 
emerged as basic determinants of medal wins at Summer Olympics, they are kept in 
elaborating on a Winter Olympics model. Keeping GDP per capita in the model is 
particularly sensible because it is obvious from Table 4 that there is a relationship 
between the number of medal wins and the level of economic development. In Table 4, 
country groups are those defined by the World Bank. Developed market economies 
(DMEs) are countries with a GDP per inhabitant over $10,725 in 2006; (newly) emerging 
economies (NMEs) are countries whose GDP per inhabitant is between $3,466 and 
$10,725; intermediary income (developing) countries (IICs) are those with a GDP per 
inhabitant between $876 and $3,465; least developed countries (LDCs) are those with a 
GDP per inhabitant below $876. At Winter Olympics a concentration of medal wins on 
DMEs is witnessed whatever the number of participating DMEs. The average number of 
medal wins is always higher in DME and NME groups than in IICs and LDCs. Even with 
a growing number of participating countries – from 4 in 1964 to 20 in 2010 for IICs and 
from 3 to 13 for LDCs – these two country groups are not able to substantially increase 
their share in the medals total. In most Winter Games, LDCs have not won even a medal 
(except in 1992 and 1994 with just one medal win). 
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Table 4 Uneven medal distribution at Winter Olympics by level of economic development 
Year 
Country 
group 
Number of 
medals 
Mean: m 
Coefficient of 
variation: σ/m 
Number of 
countries 
Countries 
with M > 0 
1964 DME 77 3.67 1.27 21 12 
 NEC 26 3.25 2.71 8 2 
 IIC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 3 0 
1968 DME 83 3.95 1.13 21 11 
 NEC 23 2.56 1.70 9 4 
 IIC 0 0 0.00 5 0 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 2 0 
1972 DME 71 3.38 1.12 21 13 
 NEC 34 4.25 1.58 8 4 
 IIC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 2 0 
1976 DME 64 2.67 1.26 24 13 
 NEC 47 5.22 1.97 9 3 
 IIC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 0 0 
1980 DME 67 2.91 1.24 23 14 
 NEC 47 5.22 1.88 9 4 
 IIC 1 0.25 2.00 4 1 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 1 0 
1984 DME 61 2.26 1.54 27 13 
 NEC 55 5 1.96 11 3 
 IIC 1 0.17 2.41 6 1 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
1988 DME 78 2.44 1.56 32 13 
 NEC 57 5.18 2.10 11 3 
 IIC 3 0.3 3.17 10 1 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
1992 DME 141 4.41 1.58 32 16 
 NEC 26 1.86 3.30 14 2 
 IIC 3 0.25 3.48 12 1 
 LDC 1 0.2 2.25 5 1 
1994 DME 149 4.52 1.58 33 16 
 NEC 23 1.44 3.99 16 1 
 IIC 10 1.67 0.76 12 4 
 LDC 1 0.83 0.49 6 1 
Notes: σ: standard deviation; M: number of medals per country. 
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Table 4 Uneven medal distribution at Winter Olympics by level of economic development 
(continued) 
Year 
Country 
group 
Number of 
medals 
Mean: m 
Coefficient of 
variation: σ/m 
Number of 
countries 
Countries 
with M > 0 
1998 DME 170 5.15 1.50 33 17 
 NEC 21 1.4 3.33 15 2 
 IIC 14 0.67 3.03 16 5 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 8 0 
2002 DME 197 5.97 1.64 33 16 
 NEC 25 1.47 2.22 17 5 
 IIC 12 0.67 2.94 18 3 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 9 0 
2006 DME 201 5.74 1.54 35 15 
 NEC 36 2.4 2.33 15 7 
 IIC 15 0.83 3.13 18 4 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 12 0 
2010 DME 207 6.09 1.60 34 16 
 NEC 36 2.4 1.70 15 7 
 IIC 15 0.75 3.35 20 3 
 LDC 0 0 0.00 13 0 
Notes: σ: standard deviation; M: number of medals per country. 
At first sight, the political regime seems to be less relevant as a variable that differentiates 
among the Winter Games medal winners; however it is kept in the model with  
some slight emendation compared to the Summer Olympics model. The reference 
country group remains CAPME for capitalist market economies; CEECs are those  
post-communist economies which have joined the EU in either 2004 or 2007; all the 
remaining post-communist economies are gathered in an EXCOM country group even 
though it would be sensible to consider Cuba and North Korea as still communist regimes 
(but their performance at Winter Games is negligible or nil). 
A political regime variable might be a significant determinant (to be tested) of medal 
distribution per nation at Winter Olympics when looking at the data (Table 5). Being a 
centrally planned economy with some sort of communist regime was an advantage to win 
Winter Olympics medals until 1988. The average number of medal wins was higher in 
the EXCOM group than in the CEEC group and in the latter it was higher than in the 
CAPME reference group during this lapse of time, even though medals were 
concentrated on a small number of communist countries, namely the former USSR. The 
collapse of the communist regime seemingly had a significant impact on the number of 
medal wins which dramatically dropped in CEECs after 1990; it dropped much less 
significantly in other former communist countries, namely in the former Soviet Union, 
and recovered as soon as 1994 while the recovery in medal wins happened only in 2010 
in CEECs. Such difference in momentum is probably due to a harsher shock of economic 
transition, a deeper and swifter transformation of the state-run sport system into a market 
sport economy in CEECs as compared with other post-communist countries, namely 
Russia. 
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Table 5 Uneven medal distribution at Winter Olympics by political regime 
Year 
Country 
group 
Number of 
medals 
Mean: m 
Coefficient of 
variation: σ/m 
Number of 
countries 
Countries 
with M > 0 
1964 CAPME 77 2.85 1.53 27 12 
 CEEC 1 0.2 2.25 5 1 
 EXCOM 25 6.25 2.00 4 1 
1968 CAPME 83 2.96 1.43 28 11 
 CEEC 10 1.67 1.35 6 3 
 EXCOM 13 4.33 1.73 3 1 
1972 CAPME 71 2.84 1.29 25 13 
 CEEC 18 3 1.84 6 3 
 EXCOM 16 4 2.00 4 1 
1976 CAPME 64 2.21 1.45 29 13 
 CEEC 20 3.33 2.31 6 2 
 EXCOM 27 13.5 1.41 2 1 
1980 CAPME 67 2.48 1.41 27 14 
 CEEC 26 4.33 2.12 6 4 
 EXCOM 22 5.5 2.00 4 1 
1984 CAPME 61 1.65 1.90 37 13 
 CEEC 30 5 1.92 6 2 
 EXCOM 26 5.2 2.13 5 2 
1988 CAPME 78 1.7 1.98 46 13 
 CEEC 28 4.67 2.15 6 2 
 EXCOM 32 6.4 1.98 5 2 
1992 CAPME 141 2.88 2.08 49 16 
 CEEC 3 0.38 2.79 8 1 
 EXCOM 27 4.5 2.03 6 3 
1994 CAPME 146 3.32 1.96 44 15 
 CEEC 3 0.3 3.17 10 1 
 EXCOM 34 2.62 2.38 13 6 
1998 CAPME 170 3.78 1.84 45 17 
 CEEC 4 0.4 2.43 10 2 
 EXCOM 31 1.82 2.53 17 5 
2002 CAPME 196 3.92 2.15 50 15 
 CEEC 12 1.2 1.17 10 5 
 EXCOM 26 1.53 2.37 17 4 
2006 CAPME 201 3.94 1.97 51 15 
 CEEC 12 1.2 1.17 10 6 
 EXCOM 39 2.05 2.67 19 5 
2010 CAPME 204 3.92 2.14 52 15 
 CEEC 21 2.1 1.13 10 6 
 EXCOM 33 1.65 2.45 20 5 
Notes: σ: standard deviation; M: number of medals per country. 
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With regards to the Regions dummy variable supposed to capture differences in sporting 
culture, it is not expected to be as much significant for Winter Olympics as it appeared to 
be for Summer Olympics. The reason is very simple: all those countries which participate 
to Winter Games have in common a sporting culture geared towards the practice of 
winter sports wherever they are located and whatever their overall sporting culture. This 
is confirmed by the fact that, contrary to Summer Olympics, many countries in the world 
do not participate to Winter Olympics. Thus, the regional dummy is skipped out from the 
Winter Olympics model. 
If a country would like to develop a wide range of winter sports on its territory, 
making it able to train and select performing athletes, it could not significantly achieve it 
without some proper weather conditions, in particular enough snow coverage per  
year, and more than a minimal endowment in winter sports resorts and facilities10.  
These two new variables are to be introduced in the model. The first one is coined 
SNOW; it is a dummy differentiating countries as regard their average degree of annual 
snow coverage. Indeed, among those countries which have participated at least once to 
Winter Olympics, the degree of snow coverage is quite variable, but it is not easy to 
obtain a precise measure of snow coverage back to 1964. Thus, data and information 
provided by Maps of the World and the World Meteorological Organisation have been 
gathered regarding main climates, snow precipitations and temperature in order to build 
up the Snow dummy. The outcome in the sample of participating countries11 is as 
follows: 
• POL (a so-called ‘polar’ coverage in countries with a long duration of annual snow 
coverage): Belarus, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, 
Nepal, Norway, Russia (by extension CIS and the former USSR), Sweden = 12 
countries 
• HIGH (local high winter snow coverage in otherwise temperate climate countries): 
Austria, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic (by extension former Czechoslovakia), 
Denmark, France, Germany (by extension former GDR), Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (by extension former Yugoslavia), Spain, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, USA = 17 countries 
• MIDDLE (local middle snow coverage in temperate climate countries): Albania, 
American Samoa, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China (including Hong Kong), Cyprus, Fiji, Georgia, 
Great Britain, Greece, Guam, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Korea, Portugal, Peru, 
Romania, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Swaziland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uruguay = 39 countries 
• LOW (countries with no or low snow coverage): Algeria, Bermuda, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, 
Iran, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands 
Antilles, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uzbekistan, 
Venezuela, Virgin Islands = 27 countries. 
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Table 6 Uneven medal distribution at Winter Olympics by level of snow coverage 
Year 
Country 
group 
Number of 
medals 
Mean: m 
Coefficient of 
variation: σ/m 
Number of 
countries 
Countries 
with M > 0 
1964 POL 60 8.57 1.06 7 5 
 HIGH 39 2.79 1,47 14 6 
 MIDDLE 4 0.31 2.03 13 3 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 2 0 
1968 POL 43 6.14 0.94 7 5 
 HIGH 53 3.53 1.08 15 8 
 MIDDLE 10 0.83 3.12 12 2 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 3 0 
1972 POL 38 6.33 1.00 6 5 
 HIGH 58 4.46 0.93 13 11 
 MIDDLE 9 0.64 3.77 14 1 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 2 0 
1976 POL 46 6.57 1.44 7 5 
 HIGH 58 4.14 1.35 14 9 
 MIDDLE 7 0.47 3.30 15 2 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 1 0 
1980 POL 47 5.88 1.30 8 5 
 HIGH 61 4.69 1.39 13 10 
 MIDDLE 7 0.50 2.18 14 4 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 2 0 
1984 POL 59 7.38 1.17 8 5 
 HIGH 57 4.07 1.53 14 11 
 MIDDLE 1 0.05 4.60 19 1 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 7 0 
1988 POL 52 6.50 1.47 8 5 
 HIGH 79 5.27 1.32 15 11 
 MIDDLE 7 0.33 4.64 21 1 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 13 0 
1992 POL 61 5.55 1.51 11 5 
 HIGH 95 6.33 1.32 15 9 
 MIDDLE 15 0.68 1.94 22 6 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 15 0 
1994 POL 73 6.08 1.55 12 6 
 HIGH 88 5.18 1.46 17 8 
 MIDDLE 18 0.72 2.14 25 6 
 LOW 4 0.31 2.74 13 2 
Notes: σ: standard deviation; M: number of medals per country. 
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Table 6 Uneven medal distribution at Winter Olympics by level of snow coverage (continued) 
Year 
Country 
group 
Number of 
medals 
Mean: m 
Coefficient of 
variation: σ/m 
Number of 
countries 
Countries 
with M > 0 
1998 POL 75 6.25 1.42 12 6 
 HIGH 98 5.44 1.47 18 9 
 MIDDLE 30 1.03 2.56 29 8 
 LOW 2 0.15 3.67 13 1 
2002 POL 73 5.62 1.44 13 7 
 HIGH 134 7.05 1.58 19 11 
 MIDDLE 27 0.96 2.33 28 6 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 17 0 
2006 POL 93 7.15 1.30 13 8 
 HIGH 122 6.78 1.43 18 11 
 MIDDLE 37 1.12 2.70 33 7 
 LOW 0 0.00 0.00 16 0 
2010 POL 86 6.62 1.39 13 8 
 HIGH 134 7.05 1.47 19 12 
 MIDDLE 37 1.12 2.95 33 5 
 LOW 1 0.59 0.41 17 1 
Notes: σ: standard deviation; M: number of medals per country. 
The distribution of medal wins across these four country groups from the 1964 to 2010 
Winter Olympics (Table 6) suggests that snow coverage might well be a significant 
determinant of medal wins in winter sports. Countries with high snow coverage, followed 
by countries with polar-like climate and snow coverage, concentrate the great bulk of 
medal wins at Winter Olympics. The number of participating countries with high snow 
coverage increased from 14 in 1964 up to 19 in 2010 while their number of medals  
won grew from 39 to 134. During the same lapse of time, the number of countries with 
polar-like snow coverage augmented from 7 in 1964 to 13 in 2010 whereas their number 
of medal wins increased from 60 to 86. On the other hand, 13 countries with middle snow 
coverage had won only four medals in 1964; they were 33 participating at the 2010 
Games where they won 37 medals. As regard countries with low (or no) snow coverage, 
the marked increase in their participation (from 2 to 17) did not translate into an 
impressive growth in medal wins (from 0 to 1 – with once four medals won in 1994 and 
once two medals in 2002). Snow coverage seems to be a differentiating factor among 
countries participating to Winter Olympics. 
A second new dummy variable is introduced in the model to capture a  
country’s endowment with winter sports resorts and facilities. Information is taken from 
data available on various websites describing ski resorts in different countries of the 
world, namely http://www.skiinfo.fr, http://www.sports-hiver.com, http://www.neigeski. 
com, http://www.levoyageur.net/stations, http://www.fr.snow-forecast.com, http://www. 
french-china.org. The RESORT dummy designed on the basis of such information 
consider a country as being endowed with many ski resorts and winter sports facilities 
when it has over 60 of them on its territory. A country with a number of skiing resorts 
between 5 and 60 is considered as having an average endowment by world standard. A 
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country with a number of ski resorts and winter sports facilities below 5 is assessed  
and ranked as having few opportunities to win medals due to her short availability of 
resorts-facilities. The three country groups are comprised of: • MANY winter sports resorts: Austria, Canada, former Czechoslovakia, France, 
Germany (GDR), Italy, Japan, Norway, Russia (CIS, USSR), Sweden, Switzerland, 
USA = 12 countries • BETWEEN many and few winter sports resorts: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, 
China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, 
Ukraine (former Yugoslavia) = 21 countries • FEW/NO winter sports resorts: Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Argentina, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ethiopia, Estonia, Fiji, 
Georgia, Great Britain, Ghana, Greece, Guam, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Peru, 
Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Virgin Islands = 62 countries. 
Table 7 Medal distribution and winter sports resorts and winter sports facilities 
Year 
Country 
group 
Number of 
medals 
Mean: m 
Coefficient of 
variation: σ/m 
Number of 
countries 
Countries 
with M > 0 
1964 MANY 89 7.42 0.97 12 10 
 BETWEEN 13 0.87 2.98 15 3 
 FEW/NO 1 0.11 3.00 9 1 
1968 MANY 91 7.00 0.57 13 12 
 BETWEEN 15 1.00 2.56 15 3 
 FEW/NO 0 0.00 0.00 9 0 
1972 MANY 89 6.85 0.69 13 13 
 BETWEEN 16 1.14 2.31 14 4 
 FEW/NO 0 0.00 0.00 8 0 
1976 MANY 95 6.79 1.15 14 12 
 BETWEEN 15 0.94 2.38 16 3 
 FEW/NO 1 0.14 2.71 7 1 
1980 MANY 95 6.79 1.11 14 13 
 BETWEEN 18 1.28 2.06 14 4 
 FEW/NO 2 0.22 2.00 9 2 
1984 MANY 100 7.14 1.10 14 13 
 BETWEEN 16 1.00 3.25 16 3 
 FEW/NO 1 0.56 0.43 18 1 
Notes: σ: standard deviation; M: number of medals per country. 
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Table 7 Medal distribution and winter sports resorts and winter sports facilities (continued) 
Year 
Country 
group 
Number of 
medals 
Mean: m 
Coefficient of 
variation: σ/m 
Number of 
countries 
Countries 
with M > 0 
1988 MANY 120 8.57 1.02 14 13 
 BETWEEN 18 1.13 2.14 16 4 
 FEW/NO 0 0.00 0.00 27 0 
1992 MANY 148 11.38 0.76 13 12 
 BETWEEN 20 1.18 1.75 17 6 
 FEW/NO 3 0.09 4.22 33 2 
1994 MANY 150 12.5 0.71 12 11 
 BETWEEN 25 1.25 1.64 20 7 
 FEW/NO 8 0.23 3.00 35 4 
1998 MANY 155 12.92 0.66 12 11 
 BETWEEN 44 2.00 1.86 22 9 
 FEW/NO 6 0.16 3.06 38 4 
2002 MANY 186 15.5 0.73 12 11 
 BETWEEN 42 1.83 1.47 23 10 
 FEW/NO 6 0.14 4.07 42 3 
2006 MANY 191 15.92 0.59 12 11 
 BETWEEN 55 2.50 1.52 22 11 
 FEW/NO 6 0.13 3.85 46 4 
2010 MANY 188 15.67 0.72 12 11 
 BETWEEN 62 2.82 1.43 22 10 
 FEW/NO 8 0.17 3.29 48 5 
Notes: σ: standard deviation; M: number of medals per country. 
Participating countries with higher endowment in ski resorts and winter sports facilities 
are used to win an increasing number of Olympic medals from 89 in 1964 to 188 in 2010 
(even 191 in 2006) while their number has always stood between 12 and 14 (Table 7). 
The number of participating countries with few or no resorts-facilities has grown from 9 
in 1964 to 48 in 2010 whereas their number of medal wins has increased from 1 to 8. The 
number of countries with an average endowment stands in between as to their medal 
wins. It seems that a shortage of ski resorts and winter sports facilities is a hindrance to 
win medals at Winter Olympics whereas medal wins benefit to well-endowed countries in 
terms of winter sports facilities. 
Thus, the model is adapted to estimating the determinants of medal wins at Winter 
Olympics as follows: 
*
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Mi,t observation is defined by 
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and N is a nation population, Y/N is its GDP per inhabitant, both variables being four-year 
lagged for the same reason as with the Summer Olympics model, Host is a dummy 
identifying the country that hosts the Games, Political Regime is a dummy which 
captures the impact of political regime on medal wins, Snow is a dummy variable 
differentiating countries as regard their degree of annual snow coverage, and Resort is a 
dummy capturing the impact of ski resorts and winter sports facilities located in a country 
on medal wins. 
6 Economic determinants of medal win at Winter Olympic Games 
Model (4) is now used for estimating whether the above-listed variables are significant 
determinants of medal wins at Winter Olympics. Econometric testing covers all Winter 
Olympics from 1964 up to 2010. Data for population and GDP per inhabitant are taken 
from CHELEM data base (which retrieves and proceeds to consistency checks between 
World Bank and OECD data). A first specification M1 resorts to a left-hand censored 
Tobit model since a non-negligible number of countries that participate to Winter 
Olympics do not win any medal. Therefore, a zero value of the Mi,t dependent variable 
does not mean that a country has not participated; a simple Tobit is worked out, not a 
Tobit 2 (with a two stage Heckman procedure). This first specification takes on board 
five explanatory variables: population, GDP per inhabitant, three dummies Host, Snow 
and Resort. The MIDDLE country group which contains the biggest number of countries 
is taken as the reference for the Snow dummy. With the same rationale, the most 
numerous FEW/NO country group is taken as the reference for the Resort dummy. In a 
second specification M2, the censored Tobit model includes in addition a Political 
Regime dummy. A third specification M3 is the one which will be used later on for 
prediction; it encompasses one more explanatory variable, i.e., the inertial variable Mi,t–4. 
In all three specifications (Table 8), GDP per inhabitant and population are very 
significant determinants of medal wins at Winter Olympics with a positive sign. Medals 
are basically shared across developed economies with rather important population. More 
interesting is that the endowment in ski and winter sports resorts is also a very significant 
determinant of medal wins. Belonging to the BETWEEN country group significantly 
increases a nation’s probability to win medals at Winter Olympics and it is even more so 
for those countries with many winter sports resorts. The very existence of winter sports 
resorts reflects a high capacity of having a winter sports practice in a country and, 
consequently, selecting experienced athletes in the national squad. 
Snow coverage surprisingly does not appear as a significant determinant of Winter 
Olympics medal wins. Compared with MIDDLE coverage country group, polar-like 
countries have a significant probability to win more medals, but this probability is not 
significant for high snow coverage countries; the probability to win fewer medals is not 
significant for low snow coverage countries. A same result shows up with the other two 
specifications M2 and M3. Indeed, some countries with high snow coverage do not 
perform that well at Winter Games such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It is not enough 
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for a country to have snow, if it does not have enough ski resorts and winter sports 
facilities to train potential medal winners. 
Table 8 Tobit estimations of medals won at Winter Olympics 
Independent variables Tobit model M1 Tobit model M2 Tobit model M3 
Log population (t – 4) 2.006*** 1.873*** 0.787*** 
Log GDP per inhabitant (t – 4) 3.732*** 6.958*** 2.813*** 
Host 2.732 3.245* 3.874*** 
Resort (ref. FEW/NO)    
 MANY 13.596*** 15.633*** 5.904*** 
 BETWEEN 5.889*** 6.951*** 2.989*** 
Snow (ref. MIDDLE)    
 POLAR 8.042*** 5.390*** 2.092** 
 HIGH 0.922 –1.292 –0.286 
 LOW –1.906 –0.313 –0.653 
Political regime (ref. CAPME)    
 CEEC  6.302*** 3.186*** 
 EXCOM  10.077*** 3.839*** 
Medals (t – 4)  0.828***  
Constant –24.198*** –34.252*** –15.733 
Number of observations 663 663 662 
Log-likelihood value –957.881 –928.749 –811.892 
Pseudo-R2 0.221 0.245 0.339 
Notes: Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% threshold. 
Introducing a Political regime dummy in the second specification improves the 
estimation overall (Pseudo-R2 increases). The host country dummy is significant (though 
at 10%). Being a Central and Eastern European post-communist nation increases her 
probability to win medals at Winter Olympics and it is even more so for the EXCOM 
country group (CIS countries and all other non-Soviet former communist countries). 
The third specification M3 is by far the best one with a marked improvement of 
Pseudo-R2. Moreover, all explanatory variables are significant except snow coverage 
with regards to high and low snow coverage countries. The inertial variable – medal wins 
at previous Winter Olympics – is significant as well and the host country dummy 
becomes significant at 1%12. This model fits well for predicting medal wins at Sochi 
Winter Games. 
7 Economic prediction of medal wins at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics: 
Russia and China 
The prediction exercise based on model M3 takes CHELEM preliminary data for 2010 as 
regard population and GDP per inhabitant and then calculates the Sochi Games outcome 
in terms of medal wins (Table 9). The expected winner (first ranked country) is the USA 
with 36 medal wins, just like it happened in Vancouver 2010 with 37 medals. Germany 
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ranks second with 28 medal wins while she has ranked first in 2006 (29 medals), 2002 
(36 medals), 1998 (29 medals), 1992 (26 medals), and second in 2010 (30 medals). 
Canada takes over the third rank with 27 medals like in Vancouver 2010 (26 medals) and 
Turin 2006 (24 medals). France is expected to win 12 medals in Sochi (8th rank) as 
against 11 in Vancouver, 9 in Turin, 11 in Salt Lake City 2002, 8 in Nagano 1998, 5 in 
Lillehammer 1994, and 9 in Albertville 1992. 
Table 9 Prediction of medal wins at Sochi Winter Olympics 
Countries 
Medals won  
in 2010 
Medal wins 
predicted in 2014 
Lower bound Upper bound 
USA 37 36 33 38 
Germany 30 28 26 30 
Canada 26 27 25 28 
Russia 15 24 21 27 
Norway 23 24 22 25 
Austria 16 15 14 16 
Sweden 11 13 12 14 
France 11 12 11 13 
China 11 11 9 13 
South Korea 14 11 10 13 
Switzerland 9 9 8 10 
Japan 5 7 6 9 
Italy 5 7 6 8 
Netherlands 8 6 5 7 
Poland 6 6 4 8 
Czech Republic 6 6 4 7 
Finland 5 5 3 6 
Australia 3 3 1 4 
Slovenia 3 2 1 4 
Croatia 3 2 0 4 
Slovakia 3 2 0 3 
Belarus 3 1 0 3 
Winning 24 medals, Russia would rank fourth at Sochi Games. It is not enough to host 
Winter Games to be the winner. However, it would be a quite better performance than the 
disastrous 15 medals won in Vancouver (6th rank) and 13 medals in Salt Lake City  
(6th rank). Sochi Olympics might materialise the end of the deep transformation in the 
Russian sports system undertaken during the 1990s and the 2000s. This would be a sign 
of Russian recovery as a Winter Olympics sporting power but without coming back to the 
1976–1988 ‘golden age’ when the Soviet team was usually winning between one fifth 
and one quarter of all distributed medals. Economic and sporting systems’ transformation 
triggered a shock on Russian and CIS medal wins whose share fell below 10% of medals 
total since 2002. In particular, the transformational recession has seriously affected 
Russia’s GDP per capita downwards until 1998; the same roughly applies to other CIS 
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countries. In our model, a decreasing GDP per capita explains a lower number of medal 
wins. A decreasing number of medals for Russia is (only partly) compensated by the 
emergence of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as more or less regular medal winners at 
Winter Games since 1994 (Table 10). 
Table 10 Medal wins by (post)-communist countries, 1964-2010 
Country 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
CEECs              
 Bulgaria     1     1 3 1  
 Czech Republic          3 3 4 6 
 Estonia           3 3 1 
 Hungary     1         
 Latvia            1 2 
 Poland   1        2 2 6 
 Romania  1            
 Slovakia            1 3 
 Slovenia         3  1  3 
 Former Czechoslovakia 1 4 3 1 1 6 3 3      
 Former GDR  5 14 19 23 24 25       
 Former Yugoslavia      1 3       
CEECs/medals total % 1.0 9.4 17.1 18.0 22.7 26.5 22.5 1.7 1.6 1.9 5.4 4.8 8.1 
CIS countries              
 Belarus         2 2 1 1 3 
 Kazakhstan         3 2   1 
 Russia         23 18 13 22 15 
 Ukraine         2 1  2  
 Uzbekistan         1     
 Former USSR 25 13 16 27 22 25 29 23*      
CIS/medals total (%) 24.3 12.3 15.2 24.3 19.1 21.4 21.0 13.4 16.9 11.2 6.0 9.9 7.4 
Other EXCOM              
 China        3 3 8 8 11 11 
 Croatia           4 3 3 
 North Korea        1      
Note: *CIS unified squad 
The confidence interval for Russian medal wins is between 21 and 27 (Table 9). So that, 
in the worst case, Russia may win less medals in 2014 than at the 1994 and 2006 Winter 
Games, which would not be considered as very rewarding by Russian sports authorities. 
Moreover, the model predicts no medal win for Kazakhstan and Ukraine at 2014 Sochi 
Games and only one for Belarus. 
The transformational recession lasted a shorter lapse of time in CEECs than in CIS 
countries. Nevertheless, the transition shock has triggered a dramatic drop in CEEC 
medal wins at Winter Games. The recovery in medal wins was quite slower than 
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economic recovery since the sports sector was not a top priority in the transition strategy 
backed by Washington organisations (the IMF and World Bank). The most spectacular 
shock on medal wins in CEECs derives from German unification in 1990. The former 
GDR also enjoyed a sort of ‘golden age’ from 1972 to 1988 with between 14 and  
25 medal wins at Winter Olympics13. At the 1992 Winter Games, the unified German 
team, taking stake of East German athletes, outperformed (with 26 medals) all 
participating countries including the CIS unified team (23 medals). Since then Germany 
became top performer at Winter Olympics with the biggest number of medals won from 
Albertville 1992 to Turin 2006 (except Lillehammer 1994, 2nd rank behind Norway, and 
Vancouver 2010, 2nd rank behind the USA). At the 2014 Sochi Games, model (4) 
forecasts only 16 medal wins for CEECs taken altogether, which would be a step back 
compared to the 2010 recovery with 21 medals though better than 12 medal wins in 2002 
and 2006. 
China would rank 9th at Sochi Games according to the model prediction. In fact, 
China has appeared as a new Winter Olympics winner since 1992, and more basically 
since 1998 (ranked 11th in 1998, 10th in 2002, 9th in 2006 and 8th in 2010) even though 
this cannot compare with the Chinese outstanding performance at the Summer Games 
hosted in Beijing. Thus, it is not surprising that the model predicts again 11 medal wins 
for China in 2014, but note that the upper bound of the confidence interval for China is 
13 medals. If the Chinese team performs very well, it may even pretend to the 7th rank in 
terms of medal wins at Sochi Games. The swift economic development of China since 
the 1990s has obviously had an impact on the nation capacity to win more Olympics 
medals in general and including at Winter Olympics. However, China’s performance at 
Winter Games is less outstanding than at Summer Games. This is probably due to a 
number of ski resorts and winter sports facilities which are not yet proportionate to the 
size of Chinese population and its increasing purchasing power. To the best of our 
knowledge, the number of winter sports participants and the number of ski resorts are 
both rapidly increasing these days in China. Probably, some time is still required to have 
a mass of winter sports participants huge enough to select a very performing national 
Chinese team of winter sports athletes. Hosting some future Winter Olympics in China 
may boost the expansion of ski resorts and winter sports practice throughout Chinese 
population. The candidature of a Chinese city close to a winter sports site would probably 
be in the prospects of some Chinese authorities in the medium term. 
8 Conclusions: economic prediction and surprising sporting outcomes 
All above predictions must be taken with a pinch of salt. This is namely due to surprising 
sporting outcomes. Indeed, there are many unexpected sporting outcomes observed ex 
post – i.e., achieved outcomes markedly different from the forecast – even though it 
happens more with the FIFA World Cup than Summer Olympics (Andreff, 2010). 
Unexpected or surprising outcomes of a sport contest have not been analysed so far. They 
happen when opponents in a sport contest have clearly uneven sporting forces, and the 
underdog wins the favourite. Elaborating on a metrics to quantify surprising sporting 
outcomes should be a promising avenue for further research. It will be possible to check 
after the 2014 Sochi Games whether these Winter Olympics were characterised with 
many or few surprising outcomes. 
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As regard the host country, Russia is not likely to win the biggest number of medals 
at Sochi Winter Games. If she was to make it with more than 27 medals, then being 
ranked third with Canada, one would be allowed to conclude that she performed well, 
better than expected on the basis of the above economic model. Such a good performance 
should be due to exceptional efforts of Russian athletes and coaches before and during 
Sochi Games. If Russia would win less than 21 medals, we could join Prime Minister 
Medvedev and President Putin in complaining that the Russian winter sports team should 
really have done better – or that it was unexpectedly bad lucky. When it comes to the 
Chinese winter sports team, if it would be able to win a significantly higher number of 
medals than 11 in Sochi, this must be considered as an excellent outcome. If the number 
were to fall quite below 11, it should be considered as a counter-performance. Not to be 
expected so far! 
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Notes 
1 Hoffmann et al. (2002) consider that an important determinant of Olympic successes lies in 
the degree to which sport and sporting activities are embedded in a nation’s culture. The proxy 
used to capture such determinant is the total number of times a country has hosted Olympic 
Summer Games between 1946 and 1998. Our regional variable does not intend to capture only 
a nation’s sporting culture but how much it is specific (different from the one of nations 
located in a different geographical area). 
2 It was certainly so until the most recent publication by Forrest et al. (2012). 
3 Bernard and Busse use the percentage of medal wins per country i for Mi,t instead. Our 
regressions are calculated with both the absolute number of medals (Table 1) and the 
percentage of medals per country, and the results are not significantly different. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   340 W. Andreff    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
4 A test of maximum likelihood shows that the rho coefficient is significant (Pr = 0.00). 
5 The data panel is not balanced since the number of existing countries in the world has 
increased between 1976 and 2004, namely due to the breakup of the former Soviet Union, 
former Yugoslavia and former Czechoslovakia (+20 countries), only partly compensated by 
the reunifications of Germany and Yemen (–2 countries). 
6 Which has been fuelled in particular by the cold war, but it has not vanished yet in a number 
of countries. 
7 A test of maximum likelihood shows that the rho coefficient is not significant (Pr = 0.26) 
which allows to choose a pooling estimation. 
8 This issue is discussed in depth in Andreff et al. (2008) explaining why it was not possible to 
integrate doping among independent variables despite the fact that we wished to do so. 
9 Some Jamaican sprint finalists have been controlled positive in doping tests during the weeks 
after the Beijing Games, which may be another explanatory variable. 
10 Some exceptions are neglected here such as Dubai with its ski resort in a country without any 
natural snow coverage and without even a second winter sports facility in the country. 
11 Some countries which have participated to Winter Olympics are excluded from the sample 
since data about population and GDP cannot be traced back to 1964. They are: Andorra, 
Caiman Islands, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Montenegro, Porto Rico, and San Marino. No big 
medal winner. 
12 A fourth specification has also been tested including the Regions dummy used in the Summer 
Olympics model. For three regions the test does not provide any result since these regions 
have never won a medal at Winter Games. For most regions, the variable is not significant 
even at a 10% threshold. 
13 For more specific determinants of Olympics performances reached by the communist GDR: 
Dryden (2006). 
